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Abstract
We study the mobile association problem: we determine the cells corresponding to each base
station, i.e, the locations at which intelligent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base
station rather than to others. This paper proposes a new approach based on optimal transport
theory to characterize the solution based on previous works on fluid approximations. We are
able to characterize the global optimal solution, as well as the user optimal solution, for the
downlink case problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the case where intelligent mobile terminals, capable of accessing multiple radio access
technologies, will decide for themselves the wireless access technology to use and the access point
to which to connect. Within this context, we study the mobile association problem, where we
determine the locations at which intelligent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base
station rather than to others.
For the user optimization problem, considering the interactions with other mobile terminals, starting
from the seminal paper of Hotelling [1] a large area of research on location games has been developed.
His paper [1] introduced the notion of spatial competition in a duopoly situation. Plastria [2]
presented an overview of the research on locating one or more new facilities in an environment where
competing facilities already exist. Gabszewicz and Thisse [3] provided another general overview
on location games. Altman et al. [4] studied the duopoly situation in the uplink case in a line
segment and realized that with the particular cost structure that arises in the cellular context more
complex cells are obtained at equilibrium. Our work focuses on the downlink case and in a more
general situation where a finite number of base stations can compete in a one-dimensional and
two-dimensional case without any assumption on the symmetry of the users location. In order
to do that, we propose a new framework for mobile association problems using optimal transport
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Table 1: Notation
N Total number of MTs in the network
K Total number of BSs
f Deployment distribution of MTs
(xi, yi) Position of the i-th BS
Ci Cell determined by the i-th BS
Ni Number of MTs associated to the i-th BS
Mi Number of carriers offered by the i-th BS
κi Penalization function of non-service
hi Channel gain function over the i-th cell
ξi Path loss exponent over the i-th cell
theory (See [5] and references therein), a theory initiated by Monge [6] and Kantorovich [7] that has
prove to be useful on many economical context [8, 9, 10]. There is a number of papers on “optimal
transport” (see [11], and reference therein) however the authors in [11] consider an optimal selection
of routes but do not use the rich theory of optimal transport. The works on stochastic geometry
are similar to our analysis of wireless networks (see e.g. [12] and reference therein) but in our case
we do not consider any particular deployment distribution function. Fluid models allow us to have
this general deployment distribution function.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formulation of the
problem of minimizing the total power of the network under quality of service constraints. We
address the problem for the downlink case where we considered two different policies: round robin
scheduling policy (also known as time fair allocation policy) and rate fair allocation policy which
are defined in Section 2 and studied precisely in Section 3 and Section 4 with uniform and non-
homogeneous distribution of users. In Section 5 we give numerical examples in both one-dimensional
and two-dimensional mobile terminals distribution. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
A summary of the notation used on this work can be found in Table 1. We consider a network
deployed on a region, denoted by D, over the plane. The mobile terminals (MTs) are distributed
according to a given deployment distribution function f(x, y). To fix ideas, if the considered region
is a square D = [0 km, 1 km]× [0 km, 1 km] and the distribution of the users is uniform f(x, y) = 1,
then the proportion of users in the sub-region A = [0 km, 1/2 km]× [0 km, 1/2 km] is∫∫
A
f(x, y) dx dy∫∫
D
f(x, y) dx dy
=
Area(A)
Area(D)
= 1/4.
The first equality is obtained because the distribution of the users is uniform. However, the ex-
pression at the left-hand side is general and it is always equal to the proportion of mobiles in a
sub-region A. To simplify the notation, we scale the function f such that∫∫
D
f(x, y) dx dy = 1.
Consequently, the function f is a measure of the proportion of users over the network.
In the network, there areK base stations (BSs), denoted by BSi , i ∈ {1, . . . , K}, located at positions
(xi, yi) , i ∈ {1, . . . , K}. We assume for the downlink case (transmission from BSs to MTs) that
between neighboring BSs, they transmit in orthogonal channels (such as in OFDMA). Furthermore,
we assume that the interference between BSs that are far from each other using the same sub-carrier
is small. Consequently, instead of considering the SINR (Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio),
we consider as performance measure the SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio). We denote by Ci the set of
mobiles associated to the i-th BS and by Ni the number of mobiles within that cell, both quantities
to be determined. If the number of mobiles is greater than the maximum number of carriers available
in the i-th cell, denoted by Maxi, we consider a penalization cost function given by
κi(Ni) =
{
0 if Ni ≤ Maxi,
κ¯i(Ni −Maxi) if Ni > Maxi.
We assume that κ¯i can be either a constant or a non-decreasing function
1. We first study the
case Ni ≤ M and we study the general case in Section 3.
The power transmitted from BSi to a MT located at position (x, y), is Pi(x, y) and the power
received at the MT is Pi(x, y)hi(x, y). We shall further assume that the channel gain corresponds
to the path loss given by hi(x, y) = (
√
R2 + di(x, y)2)
−ξ where ξ is the path loss exponent, R is
the height of the base station, and di(x, y) is the distance between a MT at position (x, y) and BSi
located at (xi, yi), i.e., di(x, y) =
√
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2. The SNR received at mobile terminals at
position (x, y) in cell Ci is given by SNRi(x, y) = Pi(x, y)hi(x, y)/σ
2, where σ2 is the noise power.
We assume that the instantaneous mobile throughput is given by the following expression, which is
based on Shannon’s capacity theorem:
θi(x, y) = log(1 + SNRi(x, y)).
We want to satisfy an average throughput for MTs located at position (x, y) given by θ¯(x, y) > 0.
We shall consider for this objective two policies defined in [13]: (A) Round robin scheduling policy:
under this policy, each BS devotes an equal fraction of time for transmission to each MT associated
to it, and (B) Rate fair allocation policy: under this policy, each base station BS maintains a
constant power sent to the mobile terminals within its cell. However, each base station modifies the
fraction of time allowed to mobile terminals with different channel gains, in order that the average
transmission rate demand is satisfied. For more information about this type of policies in the one
dimensional case, see [13].
1For example, the maximum number of possible carriers in Wi-Max is around 2048, so by using this technology
we have Maxi = 2048.
2.1 Round robin scheduling policy: Global Optimization
Following this policy, BSi devotes an equal fraction of time for transmission to MTs located within
its cell Ci. The number of MTs located in the i-th cell is Ni. As BSi divides its time of service
proportional to the quantity of users within its cell, then the throughput following the round robin
scheduling policy is given by θRRi (x, y) = θi(x, y)/Ni. In order to satisfy a throughput θ¯(x, y) under
this policy θRR(x, y) ≥ θ¯(x, y), or equivalently, in terms of the power
Pi(x, y) ≥
σ2
hi(x, y)
(2Niθ¯(x,y) − 1).
As our objective function is to minimize the total power of the network, the constraint will be
reached, and we obtain
Pi(x, y) = σ
2(2Niθ¯(x,y) − 1)([R2 + d2i (x, y)]
1/2)+ξ. (1)
From last equation we can observe that: i) if the quantity of mobile terminals increases within the
cell, it will need to transmit more power to each of the mobile terminals. The reason to do that
is because the base station is dividing each time-slot into mini-slots with respect to the number of
the mobiles within its cell, and ii) the function (R2 + d2i (x, y))
ξ/2 on the right hand side give us
the dependence of the power with respect to the distance between the base station and the mobile
terminal located at position (x, y).
Our objective is to find the optimal mobile association in order to minimize the total power of the
network. Then as the total power
Ptotal =
K∑
i=1
P intrai ,
where P intrai =
∫∫
Ci
Pi(x, y)f(x, y) dx dy,
P intrai is the intracell power consumption in cell Ci.
The global optimization for the mobile association problem, that we denote (RR), is to determine
the cells Ci, i ∈ {1, . . . , K}, to minimize the total power of the network:
Minimize
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
Pi(x, y)f(x, y) dx dy
subject to (1), where f(x, y) is the deployment distribution function of the users. We solve this
problem in Section 3.
2.2 Rate fair allocation policy: User Optimization
In the rate fair allocation policy, each BS will maintain a constant power sent to MTs within its
cell, i.e., Pi(x, y) = Pi for each MT at location (x, y) inside cell Ci. However, the BS modifies the
fraction of time allotted to MTs, set in a way such that the average transmission rate to each MT
with different channel gain is the same, denoted by Θ(x, y), for each mobile located at position (x, y).
Let ri be the fixed rate of MTs located inside cell Ci. Following the rate fair allocation policy, the
rate ri is given by (see e.g. [13]):
ri =
( ∫∫
Ci
1
log(1 + SNRi(x, y))
f(x, y) dx dy
)−1
β.
We seek for an equilibrium in the game in which each mobile terminal chooses from which base
station is served and given the interactions with the other mobile terminals it doesn’t have any
incentive to change its strategy lonely. Similar notion of equilibrium has been studied in the context
of large number of small players in road-traffic theory by Wardrop [14].
Definition.- The Wardrop equilibrium is given in the context of cellular systems by:
If
∫∫
Ci
f(x, y) dx dy > 0, then θi = max
1≤j≤K
θj(Cj), (2a)
else if
∫∫
Ci
f(x, y) dx dy = 0, then θi ≤ max
1≤j≤K
θj(Cj). (2b)
A Wardrop equilibrium is the analog of a Nash equilibrium for the case of a large number of small
players, where, in our case, we consider the mobile terminals as the players. In this setting, the
Wardrop equilibrium indicates that if there is a positive proportion of mobile terminals associated
to the i-th base station (the left-hand side condition in (2a)), then the throughput that the mobile
terminals obtain is the maximum that they would obtain from any other base station (right-hand
side consequence in (2a)). The second condition indicates that if there is one base station that
doesn’t have any mobile terminal associated to it (left-hand side condition in (2a)), it is because
the mobile terminals can obtain more throughput by connecting with one of the other base stations
(right-hand side consequence in (2a)).
We assume that each base station is serving at least one mobile terminal, (if that is not the case, we
remove the base station that is not serving any mobile terminal). Then, the equilibrium situation
is given by
θ1 = θ2 = . . . = θK .
To understand this equilibrium situation, consider as an example the simple case of two base sta-
tions: BS1 and BS2. Assume that BS1 offers more throughput than BS2. Then, the mobile terminals
being served by BS2 will have an incentive to connect to BS1. The transmitted throughput depends
inversely on the quantity of mobiles connected to the base station. As more mobile terminals try
to connect to base station BS1 the throughput will diminish until arrive to the equilibrium where
both base stations will offer the same throughput.
The condition θ1 = θ2 = . . . = θK is equivalent in our setting to r1 = r2 = . . . = rK . Let us denote
by r to the rate offered by the base station at equilibrium, i.e., r := r1 = r2 = . . . = rK . Then, as
long as we are in the low-SNR regime, by using the low-SNR approximation of throughput, i.e., the
throughput of a mobile at x is log(1 + SNR) ≈ SNR, we have that:
Pi(Ci) =
r
Θ
∫∫
Ci
σ2(R2 + d2i (x, y))
ξ/2f(x, y) dx dy. (3)
We want to choose the optimal mobile assignment in order to minimize the total power of the
network under the constraint that the mobile terminals have an average throughput of θ, i.e.,
MinimizeCi Ptotal =
∑K
i=1 P
intra
i
Then our problem reads
(RF) Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
σ2(R2 + d2i (x, y))
ξ/2f(x, y) dx dy.
We will solve this problem in Section 4.
Thanks to optimal transport theory we are able to characterize the partitions on very general
settings. For doing so, consider locations (x1, y1) . . . , (xK , yK), the Euclidean distance di(x, y) =√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2, and F a continuous function.
Theorem 2.1. Consider the problem (P1)
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
[
F (di(x, y)) + si
(∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz
)]
f(x, y) dx dy,
where Ci is the cell partition of D. Suppose that si are continuously differentiable, non-decreasing,
and convex functions. The problem (P1) admits a solution that verifies
(S1)


Ci =
{
x : F (di(x, y)) + si(Ni) +Ni · s
′
i(Ni)
≤ F (dj(x, y)) + sj(Nj) +Nj · s
′
j(Nj)
}
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz.
Proof.- See Appendix A
Theorem 2.2. Consider the problem (P2)
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
[
F (di(x, y)) ·mi
(∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz
)]
f(x, y) dx dy
where Ci is the cell partition of D. Suppose that mi are derivable. The problem (P2) admits a
solution that verifies
(S2)


Ci = {x : mi(Ni)F (di(x, y)) f(x, y) + Ui(x, y)
≤ mj(Nj)F (dj(x, y)) f(x, y) + Uj(x, y)}
Ui = m
′
i(Ni)
∫∫
Ci
F (di(x, y))f(x, y) dx dy
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz.
Proof.- See Appendix B
Notice that in problem (P1) if the functions si ≡ 0 the solution of the system (S1) becomes the
well known Voronoi cells. In problem (P2) if we have that the functions hi ≡ 1 we find again the
Voronoi cells. However in all the other cases the Voronoi configuration is not optimal.
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Figure 1: Wardrop Equilibrium: Thresholds determining the cell boundaries as a function of the
location of the base stations. The network is deployed over the interval [−10, 10] (one-dimensional
case) presented here vertically. We consider a uniform distribution of MTs and we find the threshold
(blue line) determining the cell boundaries as a function of the base stations positions (red points)
by changing the position of one of them. BS1 is fixed at position 0 and we change the position of
BS2 from −10 to +10.
3 Round Robin Scheduling Policy
We assume that a service provider wants to minimize the total power of the network while main-
taining a certain average throughput of θ to each mobile terminal of the system using the round
robin scheduling policy given by problem (RR)
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
σ2(R2 + di(x, y)
2)ξ/2(2Niθ − 1)f(x, y) dx dy.
We see that this problem is an optimal transportation problem (P1) with cost function given by
F (di(x, y)) = σ
2(R2 + di(x, y)
2)ξ/2 and
mi(x, y) = (2
Niθ − 1).
Proposition.- There exist a unique optimum given by
Ci =
{
x0 ∈ D : di(x0, y0)
p + hi(Ni) +Nih
′
i(Ni)
≤ dj(x0, y0)
p + kj(Nj) +Njk
′
j(Nj), ∀j 6= i
}
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(x0, y0) dx0 dy0
Let’s see a direct application of our results:
Example 3.1. Consider a network of N = 2500 mobile terminals distributed according to f(x) in
[0, L] (for example, with L = 5.6 miles for WiMaX radius cell). We consider two base stations at
position BS1 = 0 and BS2 = L and R = 1. Then, the mobile association threshold (the boundary
between both cells, i.e., the location at which the mobile terminals obtain the same throughput by
connecting to any of both base stations) is reduced to find x such that the following equality holds:
(2N1θ − 1)(1 + x2)f(x) + 2N1θθ log 2
[
x+
x3
3
]
=
(2N2θ − 1)(1 + (1− x)2)f(x)
+2N2θθ log 2
[
4
3
− 2x+ x2 −
x3
3
]
This is a fixed point equation on x.
If the mobile terminals are distributed uniformly, the optimal solution is given by C1 = [0, 1/2 L)
and C2 = [1/2 L, L], which is the solution that Voronoi cells would give us and the number of mobile
terminals connected to each base station is given by
N1 = N2 = 1250.
However, if the deployment distribution of the mobile terminals is more concentrated near BS2 than
BS1, consider for example f(x) = 2x, the optimal solution is given by C1 = [0, q) and C2 = [q, L]
with q = 0.6027 L and
N1 = 908 and N2 = 1592.
Notice that in the global optimization solution, the number of mobile terminals connected to BS1 is
smaller that the number of mobile terminals connected to BS2. However, the cell size is bigger.
4 Rate fair allocation policy
In this framework we give the possibility to mobile terminals to connect to the base station they
prefer in order to minimize their power cost function while maintaining an average throughput of θ.
This is the reason why we denote this type of network as hybrid network.
As we saw this problem is equivalent to
(RF) Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
σ2(R2 + d2i (x, y))
ξ/2f(x, y) dx dy.
Notice that this problem is equivalent to (P1) where the functions si ≡ 1 The problem has then a
solution given by
Proposition.- There exist a unique optimum given by
Ci =
{
x ∈ D : σ2(R2 + d2i (x0, y0))
ξ/2,
≤ σ2(R2 + d2j(x0, y0))
ξ/2, ∀j 6= i
}
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(x0, y0) dx0 dy0
which is the Voronoi cells.
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Figure 2: Wardrop Equilibrium in the Non-homogeneous case: The network is deployed over the
interval [−10, 10] (one-dimensional case) presented here vertically. We find the threshold (blue line)
determining the cell boundaries as a function of the base stations positions (red points) by changing
the position of one of them. BS1 is fixed at position 0 and we change the position of BS2 from −10
to +10. The deployment distribution of the MTs is given by f(x) = (L− x)/2L2.
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Figure 3: Wardrop Equilibrium with Multiple Base Stations: The grid area network is the inter-
val [−10, 10] presented here vertically. We consider a uniform distribution of MTs. We find the
threshold (blue line) determining the cell boundaries as a function of the base stations positions
(red lines) by changing the position of one of them. BS1 is fixed at position −10 and BS2 is fixed
at position 10 and we change the position of BS3 from −10 to +10.
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Figure 4: Wardrop Equilibrium in the 2D case: The grid area network is the square [−4, 4]× [−4, 4].
We set the noise parameter σ = 0.3 and we set four BSs at positions BS1 = (−3,−3) BS2 = (3,−3)
BS3 = (3, 3) BS4 = (−3, 3) and one at the origin BS5 = (0, 0). We determine the cell boundaries
(deep lines) for the uniform distribution of users
5 Validation of our theoretical model
5.1 One-dimensional case
We first consider the one-dimensional case and we consider a uniform distribution of users in the
interval [−10, 10]. We set the noise parameter σ = 0.3. In Fig. 1, we fix one base station BS2
at position 0 and take as parameter the position of base station BS1. We consider the path loss
exponent of ξ = 2. Red lines shows the positions of the BSs. We are able to determine the cell
boundary (solid blue curve) from BS1 and BS2 at different positions. In Fig. 3 we fix two base
stations BS1 = −10 and BS2 = 10 and we take as parameter the position of base station BS3. Red
lines shows the positions of the BSs. We determine the cell boundary (solid blue curve) from BS1
and BS3 and the cell boundary (dashed blue curve) from BS2 and BS3.
5.2 Two-dimensional case: Uniform and Non-Uniform distribution of
users
We consider the two-dimensional case. We consider the square [−4, 4]×[−4, 4] and the noise param-
eter σ = 0.3. We set five base stations at positions BS1 = (−3,−3), BS2 = (3,−3), BS3 = (−3, 3),
BS4 = (3, 3), and BS5 = (0, 0). We determine the cell boundaries for the uniform distribution of
MTs (see Fig. 4) and we compare it to the cell boundaries for the non-uniform distribution of MTs
given by f(x, y) = (L2 − (x2 + y2))/K where K is a normalization factor. The latter situation can
be interpreted as the situation when mobile terminals are more concentrated in the center and less
concentrated in suburban areas as in Paris, New York or London. We observe that the cell size of
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Figure 5: Wardrop Equilibrium in 2D Non-Homogeneous Case. The grid area network is the
square [−4, 4] × [−4, 4]. We set the noise parameter σ = 0.3 and we set four BSs at positions
BS1 = (−3,−3) BS2 = (3,−3) BS3 = (3, 3) BS4 = (−3, 3) and one at the origin BS5 = (0, 0).
We determine the cell boundaries (deep lines) for the non-uniform distribution of users given by
f(x, y) = (L2 − (x2 + y2))/K where K is a normalization factor. The latter situation takes into ac-
count when mobile terminals are more concentrated in the center and less concentrated in suburban
areas.
the base station BS5 at the center is smaller than the others at the suburban areas. This can be
explained by the fact that as the density of users is more concentrated in the center the interference
is greater in the center than in the suburban areas and then the SINR is smaller in the center.
However the quantity of users is greater than in the suburban areas.
6 Conclusions
We have studied a downlink mobile association game. We determined the location at which intelli-
gent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station rather than to others. Thanks to our
proposed approach using optimal transport theory for mobile association we are able to completely
characterize the mobile association and the cell formation under different policies from the mobile
terminals point of view and as well as from the global system point of view.
Appendix A
Theorem 6.1. Consider the problem (P1)
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
[
F (di(x, y)) + si
(∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz
)]
f(x, y) dx dy,
where Ci is the cell partition of D. Suppose that si are continuously differentiable, non-decreasing,
and convex functions. The problem (P1) admits a solution that verifies
(S1)


Ci =
{
x : F (di(x, y)) + si(Ni) +Ni · s
′
i(Ni)
≤ F (dj(x, y)) + sj(Nj) +Nj · s
′
j(Nj)
}
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz.
Proof.- The proof is based mainly from Proposition 3.5 of Crippa et al. [15]. We first define a
slightly more general relaxed formulation of the Monge problem:
WF (µ, ν) := inf
{(∫
D×D
F (di(x, y)) dγ(x, y)
)
: γ ∈ Π(µ, ν)
}
where µ and ν are probability measures, and Π(µ, ν) is the set of probability measures such that
pi1(γ) = µ and pi2(γ) = ν where pi1 is the projection on the first component and pi2 is the projection
on the second component.
We define also the unit simplex in Rk:
S =
{
c = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ R
k : ci ≥ 0,
k∑
i=1
ci = 1
}
The following step is to prove that
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
[
F (di(x, y)) + si
(∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz
)]
f(x, y) dx dy,
= inf
c∈S
{
WF (f,
k∑
i=1
ciδxi) +
k∑
i=1
si(ci)ci
}
But this holds by Theorem 2.1 and by Remark 2.2 of [15].
In Proposition 3.5 by replacing |x− xj | by F (dj(x, y)) we obtain the thesis.
Then we check that this partition is an optimum.
Appendix B
Theorem 6.2. Consider the problem (P2)
Min
Ci
K∑
i=1
∫∫
Ci
[
F (di(x, y)) ·mi
(∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz
)]
f(x, y) dx dy
where Ci is the cell partition of D. Suppose that mi are derivable. The problem (P2) admits a
solution that verifies
(S2)


Ci = {x : mi(Ni)F (di(x, y)) f(x, y) + Ui(x, y)
≤ mj(Nj)F (dj(x, y)) f(x, y) + Uj(x, y)}
Ui = m
′
i(Ni)
∫∫
Ci
F (di(x, y))f(x, y) dx dy
Ni =
∫∫
Ci
f(ω, z) dω dz.
Proof.- The proof is similar to Appendix A.
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